NEPA at 50: An Empirical Analysis of NEPA in the Courts by Ruple, John C. & Tanana, Heather
SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah 
Utah Law Digital Commons 
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship Utah Law Scholarship 
12-2020 
NEPA at 50: An Empirical Analysis of NEPA in the Courts 
John C. Ruple 
Heather Tanana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons 
** Pre-Publication Draft ** 
66 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L INST. ___ (2020). 
 
[Sept. 4, 2020 Draft] 1 
NEPA at 50: An Empirical Analysis of NEPA in the 
Courts 
 
John Ruple * 
Heather Tanana ** 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 The beginning of 2020 marked the 50th anniversary of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).1 NEPA, which has been described as the 
Magna Carta of environmental laws, is the quintessential look before you leap 
law—rather than mandating or prohibiting specific actions, NEPA requires federal 
agencies to consider environmental impacts before acting, to engage in a 
meaningful discussion with the public regarding those impacts and the tradeoffs 
they entail, and to seek ways to minimize the environmental impacts that result 
from agency actions. These procedural requirements advance NEPA’s substantive 
goals of, among other things, “prevent[ing] or eliminat[ing] damage to the 
environment and biosphere.”2  
 NEPA’s focus on process over limits and prohibitions results in a flexible 
framework, with the nature and extent of NEPA’s environmental review varying 
based upon the specifics of each proposed project. This flexibility is both a blessing 
and a curse because, while it affords agencies the ability to tailor their analysis to 
each proposed action, it also creates uncertainty in the process that applicants for 
federal permits may need to follow.  
 Controversial projects that are required to undergo NEPA review, like the 
Keystone XL Pipeline proposal, can generate compelling headlines, and anyone 
with a basic familiarity with NEPA is well aware of the stories of projects mired in 
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analytical delays and endless litigation. This paper attempts to move past anecdotes 
and headlines by looking at NEPA through the lens of empirical data.  
 We believe that moving from anecdote to empiricism will help inform 
ongoing discussions of how to streamline NEPA compliance while ensuring that 
agencies satisfy their three-fold requirement to foster environmental stewardship, 
meaningfully engage with permit applicants and the public alike, and carefully 
consider the environmental impacts before taking action. Conversely, divorcing 
NEPA reform proposals from fact greatly increases the risk that changes to NEPA’s 
implementing procedures will result in significant unintended adverse 
consequences.  
 Section II provides an overview of NEPA and pending calls for NEPA 
reform. In section III we take a hard look at the realities of NEPA compliance: How 
many NEPA decisions are completed each year? How long do those decisions take? 
And what causes the delays in NEPA compliance? We then turn to NEPA litigation, 
asking how many NEPA decisions are challenged each year, how these cases are 
resolved, and how NEPA litigation compares to other kinds of civil litigation 
involving the federal government. We also look for relationships between agency-
specific NEPA procedures and NEPA litigation that may illuminate NEPA reform 
efforts. We conclude with several overarching observations and recommendations 
for reform that are anchored in empirical data.  
 
II. BACKGROUND  
 We recognize that few people actually read law journal articles about 
NEPA, and that those who do are almost certainly familiar with the fundamental 
aspects of NEPA compliance. But even seasoned practitioners can benefit from a 
quick review of NEPA’s fundamental goals and procedural requirements, which 
frame our discussion of the burden imposed by NEPA compliance and anchor 
section III’s discussion of NEPA litigation. We then turn to efforts to reform the 
NEPA compliance process. Recent revisions to NEPA’s implementing regulations, 
the relationship between regulatory changes and the statute itself, and the likely 
impact on NEPA practice are considered. Implicit in the discussions that will follow 
is a fundamental question: How well do proposed reforms respond to the litigation 
related burdens that we identify in section III?  
 
A. NEPA Overview 
 NEPA was signed into law on January 1, 1970, on the heels of several 
environmental disasters, including the 250 million gallon Santa Barbara oil spill in 
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California3 and the repeated Cuyahoga River fires in Ohio.4 NEPA also followed 
shortly after publication of Rachel Carson’s book, Silent Spring, which documented 
how DDT and other pesticides nearly led to the Bald Eagle’s extinction.5 NEPA’s 
enactment reflected a sea change in the way the United States looked at the 
environment and a growing national consensus that federal law and policy had 
largely ignored the need to protect ecological and aesthetic values. 
 NEPA begins by declaring that, as a matter of national policy, the federal 
government “will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and 
his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and] to 
enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important 
to the Nation[.]”6  
 While other environmental laws advance their statutory objectives by 
focusing on a particular media, such as water or air and setting emission limits to 
protect those resources, NEPA adopts a procedural approach designed to ensure 
that federal agencies consider interrelated environmental impacts before acting. 
This procedural focus moves decision making out of proverbial silos by defining a 
comprehensive process for federal agencies making decisions affecting the 
environment. Under NEPA, “major federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment” must undergo an environmental review before 
those actions can proceed.7 As part of this review, agencies must take a hard look 
at potential impacts, and the public receives an opportunity to offer input before 
those decisions are made.8  
 The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which was created by 
NEPA,9 promulgates regulations to implement NEPA that are applicable to all 
federal agencies.10 Agencies may also issue their own regulations to supplement the 
CEQ regulations and address substantive and procedural mandates imposed by 
 
3  See CRAIG COLLINS, TOXIC LOOPHOLES: FAILURES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 55-56 (2010). 
4  Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of the Burning River, 45 Years Later, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
June 22, 2014.  
5  RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).  
6  42 U.S.C. § 4321. 
7  Id. § 4332(2)(C). 
8  Id. 
9  Id. § 4324. 
10  Exec. Order. No. 11991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978) (directing the CEQ to issue regulations to 
implement NEPA, and requiring all federal agencies to “comply with the regulations . . . 
except where compliance would be inconsistent with statutory requirements.”). 
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other agency-specific statutes.11 First issued in 1978,12 and subject to only one 
narrow amendment until 2020,13 the CEQ regulations explain how agencies 
determine whether a proposed federal action is likely to have a significant effect.14 
This results in a tiered system of review under which projects that have the greatest 
impacts and involve the highest level of scientific uncertainty undergo the most 
searching review. Projects that are unlikely to involve significant impacts are 
generally excluded from detailed analysis, and projects with uncertain impacts 
undergo an intermediate level of review.  
 When a federal project’s impacts are known to be significant in terms of 
their context and intensity, compliance requires the most extensive level of 
review—completion of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).15 The decision 
to license or permit a project on federal land may, for example, constitute a major 
federal action.16  
 EISs are prepared in stages. First, the lead agency publishes a Notice of 
Intent to Prepare an EIS (NOI) in the Federal Register.17 The NOI describes the 
action contemplated, as well as the reasons for the action, and solicits public 
comments on environmental issues raised by the proposed action and alternate 
means of achieving project goals.18 After considering public comment, the lead 
agency prepares a Draft EIS analyzing effects of both the proposed action and 
usually at least one alternative means of achieving the desired end.19 The Draft EIS 
compares the projected impacts from each alternative against the impacts that 
would result from a continuation of the status quo (the “no action alternative”).20 
After another public comment period, and any appropriate revisions, a Final EIS 
and Record of Decision (ROD) are issued.21 If comments on a Draft or Final EIS 
 
11  See e.g., 43 C.F.R. part 46 (the Department of the Interior’s regulations for implementing 
NEPA). 
12  43 Fed. Reg. 55990 (Nov. 28, 1978).  
13  See 51 Fed. Reg. 15618 (April 25, 1986) (eliminating the requirement to conduct a “worst 
case” analysis); see also 85 Fed. Reg. 43304 (July 16, 2020) (finalizing regulatory 
amendments that are effective as of September 14, 2020). We include citations to both the 
pre- and post-2020 amendment versions of the CEQ regulations because of ongoing 
litigation. For the sake of clarity, we use parentheticals (2019) and (2020) to refer to the pre- 
and post-2020 amendment versions of the regulations.  
14  40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a)(1) (2019); id. § 1501.5 (2020). 
15  Id. § 1502.3 (2019); id. § 1502.3 (2020).  
16  Id. § 1508.18(a) (2019); id. § 1508.1(q)(2) (2020).  
17  Id. § 1501.7 (2019); id. § 1501.9(d) (2020). 
18  Id. 
19  Id. §§ 1502.9(a), and 1502.14—1502.16 (2019); id. §§ 1502.9(b) and 1502.16 (2020). 
20  Id. § 1502.14(d) (2019); id. §§ 1502.16(a)(1) and 1502.14(c) (2020). 
21  Id. § 1502.9(b) (2019); id. §§ 1502.9(c) and 1505.2 (2020).  
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identify significant issues that escaped consideration, or if major changes are made 
to the proposed action, the lead agency may prepare a Revised or Supplemental 
EIS.22 
 Most federal actions do not involve significant environmental impacts and 
therefore do not require an EIS.23 In many respects, the objective of modern NEPA 
practice has evolved into an effort to demonstrate that project impacts fall below 
the significance threshold, often through mitigation or modifications to a proposed 
action. Agencies promulgate regulations or otherwise specify “Categorical 
Exclusions” (CEs)—categories of actions that the agency determines do not have a 
significant impact on the human environment.24 Actions that fall within one of these 
regulatory CEs can be approved without an EIS, provided that the action does not 
involve “extraordinary circumstances.”25 Congress has also created statutory CEs 
for certain types of oil and natural gas development.26  
 Actions falling outside the scope of a CE can still avoid preparation of an 
EIS if a federal agency prepares an Environmental Assessment (EA) determining 
that the proposed action would not cause significant impacts.27 If projected impacts 
are not significant, the agency issues a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) 
and the NEPA review process is complete.28 Alternatively, the agency may issue a 
“mitigated FONSI,” which includes measures to reduce impacts below the level of 
 
22  Id. § 1502.9(c) (2019); id. § 1502.9(d) (2020).  
23  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-370, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTERS: NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON 
NEPA ANALYSES, 8 (Apr. 2014) (hereinafter GAO-14-370) (noting that EISs are required 
for less than 1% of all federal actions undergoing NEPA review). 
24  40 C.F.R. §§ 1507.3(b)(2)(ii) and 1508.4 (2019); id. § 1501.4(a) (2020). The CEQ’s 2020 
regulations no longer address “indirect” and “cumulative” effects, and specifically repeal 
“cumulative impact.” Id. C.F.R. § 1508.1(g)(3) (2020). This change is highly controversial 
and a focus of ongoing litigation.  
25  Id. § 1508.4 (2019); id. § 1501.4(b) (2020). But note that under the 2020 rules, an agency 
may still use a CE if “the agency determines that there are circumstances that lessen the 
impacts or other conditions sufficient to avoid significant effects.” Id. § 1501.4(b)(1) (2020). 
It is unclear how an agency will determine and document whether “circumstances” reduce 
effects to below the level of significance, and this too is a question raised in ongoing 
litigation.  
26  See e.g., Energy Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15942. 
27  40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2019); id. § 1501.5 (2020). 
28  Id. § 1501.4(e) (2019); id. § 1501.6 (2020). 
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significance.29 However, if after completing an EA, the proposed action is 
determined to have a significant effect, an EIS is required.30  
 NEPA does not explicitly provide a cause of action against federal agencies 
for alleged statutory noncompliance, and judicial review of agency decisions for 
failure to comply with NEPA is available under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).31 Judicial review under the APA is available because the statute directs that 
“[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected 
or aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review 
thereof.”32 The APA also provides that “final agency action for which there is no 
other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.”33 A challenge to 
an agency’s decision for failure to comply with NEPA is resolved based on the 
administrative record which consists of all materials that were before the agency 
when it made the challenged decision.34 
 Whether a NEPA document adequately discusses the environmental effects 
of an action is largely a question of fact, and reviewing courts generally apply the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard when reviewing NEPA determinations.35 
Following the Court’s opinion in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,36 
courts have generally applied a “hard look” test when reviewing the adequacy of 
an agency’s NEPA review. “Hard look,” in the NEPA context includes identifying 
the relevant areas of environmental concern, and with respect to the problems that 
were studied and identified, making a convincing case as to the significance or 
insignificance of that impact.37 The inquiry into the adequacy of the agency’s 
analysis is contextual and case-specific, and a reviewing court must take a “holistic 
view of what the agency has done to assess environmental impact.”38 The Ninth 
Circuit describes the hard look doctrine as requiring a reviewing court to consider 
 
29  Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act 
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18037 (Mar. 23, 1981); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(c) (2020). 
30  40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c) (2019); id. § 1502.3 (2020). 
31  5 U.S.C. §§ 551-596. See, e.g., Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 661 F.3d 1209 (10th 
Cir. 2011). 
32  5 U.S.C. § 702. 
33  Id. § 704. 
34  Sherwood v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 842 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 2016). 
35  Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989). 
36  Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
37  Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. U.S. Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 
1040 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
38  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 186 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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all foreseeable direct and indirect impacts and discuss adverse effects without 
minimizing negative side effects.39 In the Eleventh Circuit,  
 
The court will overturn an agency's decision as arbitrary and 
capricious under ‘hard look’ review if it suffers from one of the 
following: (1) the decision does not rely on the factors that Congress 
intended the agency to consider; (2) the agency failed entirely to 
consider an important aspect of the problem; (3) the agency offers 
an explanation which runs counter to the evidence; or (4) the 
decision is so implausible that it cannot be the result of differing 
viewpoints or the result of agency expertise.40 
 
B. Criticisms & Calls for NEPA Reform 
 Many federal agencies, including those that manage our nation’s public 
lands, expend significant resources complying with NEPA. Some contend that 
NEPA compliance is unduly burdensome and that environmental activists have use 
NEPA litigation in a systematic effort to stop or delay wide-ranging federal actions. 
Some of the harshest criticisms were proffered by staff to the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Natural Resources in 2018 when they described 
NEPA as the “weapon of choice”—a form of “lawfare,” used by activists for the 
“manipulation of the legal system” to “stop, delay, restrict, or impose additional 
costs on all types of federal action.”41  
 NEPA’s defenders counter that “for more than four decades, [NEPA] has 
provided the foundation for countless improvements in our environmental laws. It 
gives us cleaner water, cleaner air, and a safer and healthier environment.”42 Others 
laud NEPA for the Act’s public involvement opportunities and for requiring 
 
39  League of Wilderness Defenders-Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
689 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2012). 
40  Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002). 
41  U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Natural Resources, Majority Committee Staff 
Hearing Memorandum, The Weaponization of the National Environmental Policy Act and 
the Implications of Environmental Lawfare 1 (Apr. 23, 2018); see also Chris Esparza, Staff 
of House Comm. on Natural Resources Majority Committee, Memorandum to all Natural 
Resources Committee Members 4 (Nov. 27, 2017) (NEPA “has become a magnet for 
litigation, with hundreds of NEPA-related lawsuits against the federal government filed or 
open each year.”). 
42  Recognizing the Importance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 113 Cong. E1637 
(2013) (Statement of Rep. Quigley). 
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consideration of reasonable alternatives that limit the amount of damage done to 
the environment.43 
 Regardless of how people see NEPA, there appears to be broad agreement 
that NEPA’s implementing regulations, which have received but one substantive 
amendment since their enactment,44 can be modernized in order to ease the burden 
of NEPA compliance. The question that sows division between NEPA’s critics and 
supporters is what reform should entail.  
 We believe that any change to NEPA’s implementing regulations should be 
grounded on an accurate understanding of how NEPA functions in practice, and we 
are concerned that recent amendments to the CEQ’s NEPA’s implementing 
regulations as well as proposed amendments to the U.S. Forest Service’s NEPA 
regulations appear largely unmoored from empirical information. This is not a 
philosophical disagreement over jobs versus the environment, but a question of 
good governance. As we recently wrote elsewhere, “[t]o make changes to a system 
that we don’t understand and with no way to accurately evaluate the effect of those 
changes is no way to run a business or a government. Regulatory changes should 
be grounded in fact and data if we are to avoid significant unintended 
consequences.”45 And on that note, we turn our attention to describing how federal 
agencies implement NEPA.  
 
III. THE BASELINE—NEPA BY THE NUMBERS 
 Any discussion of reforming a regulatory program should necessarily begin 
with an understanding of the nature and extent of that program: How many actions 
are subject to review each year? Which of the tools (EISs, EAs, and CEs) available 
to federal agencies receive the most use? How long does NEPA compliance 
normally take? And what are the most common factors that result in delays 
completing the NEPA process?  
 With this information as background, we then turn to NEPA litigation, 
asking: How much NEPA litigation occurs? What kinds of decisions are 
challenged? How are cases resolved? And how do government agencies fare in 
NEPA litigation compared to other kinds of civil litigation in which the federal 
 
43  Robert W. Adler, In Defense of NEPA: The Case of the Legacy Parkway, 26 J. OF LAND, 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. LAW 297, 317 (2006). 
44  In 1978, the CEQ promulgated Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of 
the National Environmental Policy Act, 40 C.F.R. § 1500–08, 43 Fed. Reg. 55978 (Nov. 29, 
1978). Since then, the CEQ has amended its NEPA regulations substantively only once, 
eliminating the “worst case” analysis requirement previously found at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22. 
See 51 Fed. Reg. 15618 (Apr. 25, 1986). 
45  John Ruple & Heather Tanana, Debunking the Myths Behind the NEPA Review Process, 35 
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 1, 14 (2020).  
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government is a defendant? Answers to those questions can help identify best 
practices and inform effective regulatory reform.  
 
A. How Burdensome is NEPA Compliance? 
 NEPA regulatory reform proceeds on the assumption that compliance is 
unduly burdensome.46 There is no question that tens of thousands of NEPA 
decisions occur each year, or that the federal government expends significant time 
and resources on NEPA compliance. In this section, to determine whether change 
is warranted on this basis, we explore the number of NEPA decisions completed 
each year and the average amount of time expended on each decision.  
 
1. How, and How Much, is NEPA Getting Done? 
 Logically, we would start this section by saying how many federal agency 
actions are subject to NEPA review each year, but we cannot. No federal agency 
tracks government-wide NEPA decision making, and federal agencies are not 
required to track or report their individual NEPA decisions. We therefore lack hard 
data and must rely instead on estimates. We estimate that roughly 45,000 NEPA 
decisions are completed annually. In order to understand how we came to that 
figure, a more fulsome understanding of NEPA implementation is required.  
 In 2014, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that 95% 
of NEPA documents involve CEs, nearly 5% are EAs, and less than 1% are EISs.47 
We begin by discussing EISs, because they involve the most detailed analysis and 
therefore require more time and resources to complete compared to more common 
NEPA documents. We also have high quality data regarding the number of EISs 
that are prepared annually. We then turn to EAs and CEs.  
 NEPA’s implementing regulations require agencies to circulate their draft 
and final EISs,48 and to notify the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of all 
completed EISs.49 The EPA then publishes a notice of EIS availability in the Federal 
 
46  See e.g., 85 Fed. Reg. 43305 (July 16, 2020) (explaining that the CEQ revised NEPA’s 
implementing regulations in part because “the NEPA process has become increasingly 
complicated and can involve excessive paperwork and lengthy delays . . . [and] the NEPA 
process continues to slow or prevent the development of important infrastructure and other 
projects that require Federal permits or approvals.”). 
47  GAO-14-370, supra note 31, at 8; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF ENVTL. PROF. OF THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (NEPA) WORKING GROUP, ANNUAL NEPA REPORT 2009, 
23 (2010) (noting that under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 94.9% 
of projects were authorized after undergoing a CE, 4.6% underwent an EA, and just 0.5% 
required an EIS).  
48  40 C.F.R. § 1502.19 (2019); id. §§ 1502.20 and 1503.1 (2020). 
49  Id. § 1506.9 (2019); id. § 156.10 (2020). 
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Register.50 The EPA maintains a searchable database of every EIS that provides 
accurate and detailed information on the number of draft, final, and supplemental 
EISs that are completed every year.51 According to notices of EIS availability 
published in the Federal Register and identified using the EPA database, there were 
an average of 456 EISs produced annually from 2001 through 2019.52 This included 
draft, final, and all forms of supplemental EISs.  
 The total number of EISs prepared annually has declined steadily over the 
past nineteen years, falling from 616 in 2004 to 315 in 2019, with a production 
average of 456 EIS per year over the 19-year period of record. Draft EISs account 
for slightly more than half of all EISs, 235 annually.53 Final EISs average 218 
annually.54 The distinction between Draft and Final EIS is important because a 




50  Id. § 1506.10 (2019); id. § 1506.11(a) (2020). 
51  Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Database, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://cdxnodengn.epa.gov/cdx-enepa-public/action/eis/search (last visited Aug. 
20, 2020) [hereinafter EPA EIS Database]. 
52  Calculated from id.  
53  Id. This includes Revised and Supplemental Final EISs.  
54  Id.  
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 The number of EISs prepared each year varies dramatically by agency, and 
the Forest Service routinely prepares more EISs than any other agency.55 The BLM 
is also consistently among the top federal agencies in terms of the number of EISs 
produced each year,56 and together, the four primary federal land management 
agencies prepared 41.9% of all EISs from 2001 through 2019.57 As with EIS 
production across the federal government as a whole, the number of EISs prepared 
annually by the four primary federal land management agencies also declined, led 
in large part by a reduction in the number of EISs prepared by the Forest Service. 
Although notably, the number of EISs prepared by the BLM increased slightly over 
the same period. 
 
 
55  See e.g., CHARLES P. NICHOLSON, NAT’L ASS’N OF ENVTL. PROF., 2018 ANNUAL NEPA 
REPORT 3 (2019).  
56  Id. 
57  Calculated from data available from the EPA EIS Database, supra note 59. 
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Figure 2.  
 
 
 Because federal agencies are not required to report EAs or CEs, we have no 
comparable source from which to systematically identify NEPA documents, or 
from which we can accurately count all federal NEPA decisions. We can, however, 
estimate the number of NEPA decisions completed annually based on the data 
reported by the GAO. 
 The GAO estimates that 95% of NEPA documents involve CEs, nearly 5% 
are EAs, and less than 1% are EISs.58 According to notices of EIS availability 
published in the Federal Register, there were an average of 456 EISs produced 
annually from 2001 through 2019, included draft, final, and supplemental EISs.59 
Extrapolating from the number of EISs prepared annually, we estimate that the 
federal government completes approximately 45,600 final NEPA decisions 
 
58  GAO-14-370, supra note 31, at 8. 
59  EPA EIS Database, supra note 59. 
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annually.60 Specifically, we estimate that federal agencies prepare roughly 43,000 
CEs, 2,300 EAs, and 450 EISs per year.61  
 The percentage of NEPA decisions that are evaluated in an EIS versus an 
EA or CE also varies by agency. The GAO notes that the Department of Energy 
(DOE) reported 95% of its NEPA documents are CEs, 2.6% were EAs, and 2.4% 
were EISs.62 In contrast, the Forest Service is much more likely to prepare an EA, 
reporting that 78% of its NEPA analyses were CEs, 20% were EAs, and 2% were 
EISs.63 The BLM, by comparison, appears exceedingly reluctant to prepare an EIS.  
 Beginning in FY 2015, the BLM began posting its NEPA documents 
online.64 Based on completed NEPA documents from FY 2016 through FY 201965 
that were published to the BLM’s e-planning website, the BLM completed 3,492 
Determinations of NEPA Adequacy (DNAs),66 9,778 CEs, 5,016 EAs, and just 20 
EISs. Accordingly, 72.5% of the BLM’s NEPA decisions involve a DNA or CE, 
27.4% involve EAs, and just 0.1% involve an EIS.  
 The BLM appears slightly more willing to prepare EISs for hard rock 
mining projects than for federal actions as a whole, and extremely unlikely to 
prepare EISs for oil and gas projects. Indeed, over the past four years, the BLM 
completed NEPA documentation for 4,600 oil and gas projects, only two of which 
 
60  The estimate used in this paper is lower than the estimate reported in John C. Ruple & Kayle 
M. Race, Measuring the NEPA Litigation Burden: A Review of 1,499 Federal Court Cases, 
50 ENVTL. L. 479 (2020), which estimated annual NEPA production based on the number 
of EISs completed from 2001 through 2013 rather than 2001 through 2019, as used herein.  
61  Our estimates do not total to 45,600 because of rounding, and because we treat EISs and 1% 
of all NEPA decisions even though the CEQ describes them as less than 1%. Our estimates 
are therefore a conservative estimate of what is likely minimum annual NEPA production. 
Our estimates also do not include Determinations of NEPA Adequacy that are routinely 
completed by the Bureau of Land Management.  
62  GAO-14-370, supra note 31, at 8. 
63  Id. 
64  See BLM National NEPA Register, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-
front-office/eplanning/lup/lup_register.do (last visited Aug. 20, 2020). Unless noted 
otherwise, we extrapolated from the GAO’s figures in order to estimate the BLM’s total 
NEPA burden. We did not extrapolate from the BLM’s figures because of the short period 
of BLM data (4 years) and because we do not know if all BLM NEPA documents were 
reported on the e-planning web site.  
65  We limited our estimate to decisions starting in FY 2016 because data for FY 2015 appeared 
to be incomplete.  
66  According to the BLM Manual, a DNA is “a worksheet for determining and documenting 
that a new, site-specific proposed action both conforms to the existing land use plan(s) and 
is adequately analyzed in existing NEPA documents.” BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., LAND USE 
PLANNING MANUAL 1601 (2000).  
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were evaluated in an EIS. It appears that the BLM reserves EISs almost exclusively 
for Land Management Plans covering expansive landscapes. The BLM’s NEPA 
compliance efforts are therefore already heavily streamlined. 
 
Table 1. 
All BLM NEPA Decisions Completed Per Fiscal Year 
 EISs EAs CEs DNAs Total 
2019  2   1,140   2,192   859   4,193  
2018  4   1,263   2,822   1,007   5,096  
2017  1   1,361   2,545   886   4,793  
2016  13   1,252   2,219   740   4,224  
Total  20   5,016   9,778   3,492   18,306  
Average  5  1,254  2,444.5  873  4,577  




BLM Mineral Program NEPA Decisions Completed Per Fiscal Year 
 EISs EAs CEs DNAs Total 
2019  -     36   74   38   148  
2018  1   62   79   47   189  
2017  -     58   83   45   186  
2016  5   43   75   39   162  
Total  6   199   311   169   685  
Average 1.5 49.75 77.75 42.25 171.25 
% of Total 0.9% 29.1% 45.4% 24.7% 100.0% 
 
Table 3. 
BLM Oil & Gas NEPA Decisions Completed Per Fiscal Year 
 EISs EAs CEs DNAs Total 
2019  -     630   370   266   1,266  
2018  -     561   433   229   1,223  
2017  -     578   341   193   1,112  
2016  2   668   229   100   999  
Total  2   2,437   1,373   788   4,600  
Average 0.5 609.25 343.25 197 1150 
% of Total <0.1% 53.0% 29.9% 17.1% 100.0% 
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2. How Long Does NEPA Compliance Take?  
 Common actions that agencies have evaluated and determined do not pose 
significant environmental impacts can normally be approved quite quickly in a CE, 
provided that they do not involve any extraordinary circumstances. Actions that do 
not qualify for a CE and that are unlikely to rise to the level of significance requiring 
an EIS are normally subject to the intermediate level of review contained in an EA. 
Preparation times can vary dramatically depending on the level of analysis and 
between agencies.  
 A CE can take as little as 1 to 2 days to complete, as reported by the DOE 
and the Department of the Interior’s Office of Surface Mining; while the Forest 
Service reports taking an average of 177 days to complete CEs.67 EAs take longer 
to complete, ranging from 1 month for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 4 months for 
the Department of Interior’s Office of Surface Mining, and 13 months for the 
Department of Energy, to 18 months for the Forest Service.68  
 Across all federal agencies, EISs take the longest and have the greatest 
variability in completion times. The CEQ reviewed 1,161 EISs completed from 
2010 through 2017 and reported a median preparation time of 3.6 years and an 
average (mean) of 4.5 years from issuance of an NOI to publication of a Record of 
Decision.69 The fastest 25% of EISs took less than 2.2 years to complete, and the 
fastest EIS completion time overall was 1 year (achieved by 36 out of 1,161 EISs 
between 2010 and 2017).70 By contrast, the slowest 25% took more than 6.0 years 
to complete.71 Most of the time involved in EIS preparation is spent between 
publication of the NOI and release of the Draft EIS, a mean of 2.6 years, compared 
to 1.4 years to move from the Draft to Final EIS, and 0.4 years to move from FEIS 
to ROD.72 This may indicate that while responding to public comment can consume 
significant resources, far more time is spent on impact analysis. 
 Mean completion times can be skewed by projects, like the Yucca Mountain 
Geologic Repository for Radioactive Waste, that are uniquely complicated and 
fraught with political peril.73 Data from the National Association of Environmental 
 
67  GAO-14-370, supra note 31, at 16. 
68  Id. at 15–16. 
69  Executive Office of the President, Council on Environmental Quality Environmental Impact 
Statement Timelines (2010–2017), 4 (Dec. 14, 2018) (hereinafter CEQ EIS Timelines).   
70  Id. at 4.   
71  Id. 
72  Id. at 5. 
73  The NOI for the Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level 
Radioactive Waste Construction Operation Monitoring and Eventually Closing a Geologic 
Repository at Yucca Mountain Nye County, Nevada was published on August 13, 1999 and 
11 draft, final, or supplemental EISs followed.  
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Professionals (NAEP) shows that from 1997 through 2016, more EISs were 
completed within 1 to 2 years than any other time period.74 The time required to 
complete an EIS has, however, increased and NAEP found that the most common 
time period for EISs completed in 2018 EISs was 2 to 3 years.75 
 Three caveats are important: First, data on the time required to prepare an 
EIS does not indicate how much work was completed before the NOI. Many 
agencies frontload their NEPA efforts by meeting with stakeholders and 
cooperating agencies, documenting existing conditions, or investigating project 
impacts and potential alternatives to the proposed action before an NOI is ever 
published.  
 Second, delays that occur during the environmental impact analysis may 
have nothing to do with NEPA. Both the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
and the GAO recognize that NEPA often functions as an “umbrella” statute and 
that studies, reviews, or consultations required under other environmental laws are 
routinely integrated into the NEPA process.76 This makes it difficult to distinguish 
between time spent on NEPA and on concurrent efforts to comply with other laws. 
It also means that time spent complying with other laws may delay NEPA.77 As the 
CRS explains, “[t]he need to comply with another environmental law, such as the 
Clean Water Act or Endangered Species Act, may be identified within the 
framework of the NEPA process, but NEPA itself is not the source of the obligation. 
If, hypothetically, the requirement to comply with NEPA were removed, 
compliance with each applicable law would still be required.”78  
 The GAO also highlights the importance of sources of delay outside NEPA 
procedures, such as engineering requirements and holdups associated with 
obtaining nonfederal approvals.79 A 2012 CRS study of EIS’s prepared by the 
Federal Highway Administration specifically found that delays were “more often 
tied to local/state and project-specific factors, primarily local/state agency 
priorities, project funding levels, local opposition to a project, project complexity, 
or late changes in project scope [than NEPA].”80 
 
74  NAEP, 2017 ANNUAL NEPA REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
(NEPA) PRACTICE 12 (2018). 
75  NAEP, 2018 ANNUAL NEPA REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
(NEPA) PRACTICE 11 (2019). 
76  GAO-14-370, supra note 31, at 19; Congressional Research Service, The National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA): Background and Implementation 2 (2011) (hereinafter 
CRS NEPA Background).  
77  GAO-14-370, supra note 31, at 18-19. CRS NEPA Background, supra note 84, at 8-9. 
78  CRS NEPA Background, supra note 84, at 2. 
79  GAO-14-370, supra note 31, at 15, 19. 
80  Congressional Research Service, The Role of the Environmental review Process in Federally 
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 The Forest Service has been uniquely candid about delays in completing its 
NEPA analysis, explaining that NEPA projects in Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Utah were 
all delayed during 2012 or 2013 when agency resources were redirected to wildfire 
related programs.81 Comparable information is unavailable for other years, but 
between 1999 and 2015, the Forest Service was forced to reallocate funds in order 
to address wildfire management needs, resulting in a whopping 64% reduction in 
land management planning funding.82 This reduction may help explain the steep 
decline in Forest Service EISs over that period. Reallocation of agency resources 
away from NEPA continues to be a problem,83 and delays like those identified in 
2012 and 2013 presumably continue.84  
 Third, federal agencies have become more discerning in identifying the 
actions that require review in an EIS. This is reflected both in the number of EISs 
prepared nationally, which has fallen by almost 40 percent over the last decade, and 
a corresponding rise in CEs and EAs.85 As in the case of the Forest Service, this 
may reflect practical necessity in the face of declining budgets. As federal agencies 
have increased the threshold for preparing an EIS, the complexity of the 
environmental issues that are addressed in those EISs has also increased. More 
complex evaluations invariably require more time to complete.  
 
 
Funded Highway Projects: Background and Issues for Congress Summary (2012). 
81  U.S. FOREST SERVICE, DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, FIRE IMPACT [BY] STATE (June 9, 2014). 
82  U.S. FOREST SERVICE, DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, THE RISING COST OF FIRE OPERATIONS: 
EFFECTS ON THE FOREST SERVICE’S NON-FIRE WORK 11 (2015). 
83  Between 1998 and 2015, the portion of the Forest Service’s budget that was devoted to 
wildfire management more than tripled, requiring the Service to redirect funds from other 
areas and resulting in a 32% reduction in funds that were available for National Forest 
System management. Staffing levels fell by 7,000 or 39% over that same time period.  Id. 
at 6-7. 
84  See e.g., Forest Service Proposed NEPA Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 27544 (June 13, 2019) 
(justifying regulation changes in part because of reduced agency resources).  
85  See supra, section III.A.1.  
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3. Does NEPA Delay Agency Decisions? 
 There is no question that NEPA compliance consumes significant agency 
time and resources. It is also clear that many federal actions that trigger NEPA 
review also trigger permitting requirements contained in other federal, state, or 
local laws. It is therefore important to ask whether NEPA compliance represents an 
additive burden or an opportunity to coordinate permitting efforts. It is also helpful 
to ask whether NEPA is more efficient than the alternative. A circuit split on 
NEPA’s applicability to Endangered Species Act critical habitat designations 
creates a natural test of the extent to which NEPA delays federal agency action.  
 Critical habitat designation under the ESA is a federal action that may 
impact environmental quality. In 1981, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the Fish and 
Wildlife Service was not required to prepare an EIS before listing a species as 
threatened or endangered under the ESA.86 Two years later, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service issued a “rule-related notice” indicating that a NEPA analysis was not 
 
86  Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1981). 
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required for critical habitat designations either.87 In 1995, the Ninth Circuit upheld 
the Service’s approach, explaining:  
 
NEPA does not apply to the Secretary’s decision to designate a 
habitat for an endangered or threatened species under the ESA 
because (1) Congress intended that the ESA critical habitat 
procedures displace the NEPA requirements, (2) NEPA does not 
apply to actions that do not change the physical environment, and 
(3) to apply NEPA to the ESA would further the purposes of neither 
statute.88  
 
 But in 1996, the Tenth Circuit created a split with the Ninth Circuit by 
holding that critical habitat designations do require NEPA analysis.89 The Tenth 
Circuit concluded that the procedural requirements of the ESA did not displace 
NEPA’s procedural requirements, that the critical habitat designation could result 
in potentially significant environmental impacts, and that an EA would help the 
Service determine those effects; therefore, NEPA compliments rather than 
displaces the ESA.90  
 From 1999 through 2017, the Fish and Wildlife Service and NOAA 
Fisheries promulgated critical habitat rules for 643 ESA listed species.91 Because 
of the circuit split, rules for species with habitat within the Tenth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction underwent NEPA analysis while rules for species residing outside of 
the Tenth Circuit did not.92 Comparing the two groups of cases, critical habitat rules 
that underwent NEPA review were completed more than three months faster than 
rules that did not undergo NEPA review.93  
 
87  48 Fed. Reg. at 49244. 
88  Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 1995). 
89  Catron Cty. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1439 (10th Cir. 1996).  
90  Id. at 1436.  
91  See ECOS (ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION ONLINE SYSTEM), USFWS THREATENED & 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACTIVE CRITICAL HABITAT REPORT, 
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/table/critical-habitat.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2020). 
ECOS includes information on rules promulgated by NOAA Fisheries as well as the Fish & 
Wildlife Service. Id. 
92 See Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 144 F. Supp. 3d 35, 43 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(explaining that the Service has taken the position that “outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, we do not need to prepare environmental analyses 
as defined by NEPA in connection with designating critical habitat under the Act”).  
93 John C. Ruple, Michael J. Tanana & Merrill M. Williams, Does NEPA Help or Harm ESA 
Critical Habitat Designations? An Assessment of Over 600 Critical Habitat Rules, 46 
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 While it isn’t clear why decisions that underwent NEPA were completed 
faster, it may be that the NEPA process acts as a mechanism to coordinate parallel 
efforts that are being undertaken by multiple regulatory agencies. Increased 
coordination may reduce duplicated efforts. NEPA may also create a mechanism 
for addressing issues earlier in the permitting process, when project modifications 
are easier and less costly. Finally, other permitting decisions, like permits to fill 
wetlands, could tier to the NEPA analysis or utilize information gathered for an EA 
or EIS.  
 It is also noteworthy that many of the delays that can arise during the NEPA 
process are attributable to independent events. As the Congressional Research 
Service recently explained:    
Depending on the project, local and state issues often have the most 
influence on whether a given project moves forward relatively 
quickly or takes longer than anticipated. Those issues include the 
project’s level of priority among others proposed in the state; 
changes in funding availability (issues with funding availability will 
also vary depending on whether the project’s funding source is a 
private or public entity); and local controversy or opposition to the 
project (which may or may not be connected to environmental 
issues).94 
 
This is not to say that delays are insignificant, but rather that reform efforts must 
be careful to accurately identify the cause of delay and treat the root causes rather 
than the symptom if reform efforts are to meet with success.  
 
4. Does NEPA Result in Less Environmentally Harmful 
Decisions? 
 We readily concede that federal agencies expend significant resources on 
NEPA compliance and that reducing the burden of compliance is an important goal. 
But burden alone, we believe, should not be a basis for regulatory reform. The 
question is whether the benefits justify the burden of compliance. 
 Most of the literature addressing NEPA’s benefits is either anecdotal in 
nature or drawn from interviews and focus groups.95 While this literature is 
 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 829, 842 (2020).  
94 Congressional Research Service, Memorandum to the House Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways and Transit 5 (June 7, 2017).  
95 NEPA SUCCESS STORIES: CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN 
GOVERNMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE (2010); EXAMPLES OF BENEFITS FROM 
THE NEPA PROCESS FOR ARRA FUNDED ACTIVITIES, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON 
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valuable, we recognize the hypocrisy in relying on such information while 
simultaneously criticizing others for attacking NEPA based on isolated examples 
that are unmoored from empirical data. Research quantifying both the burden and 
benefits should be a priority if we are to ensure that reforms result in improved 
outcomes.  
 To begin the discussion, we note two recent studies that reviewed EISs for 
BLM Resource Management Plans and for oil and gas field developments. These 
studies compared the impacts anticipated under the proposed action in the Draft 
EIS to what was authorized in the ROD. The difference between the two iterations 
reflects change occurring during the NEPA process. For the oil and gas EISs, 
impacts to all measured indicators were reduced between the Draft EIS and the 
ROD.96 Statistically significant reductions (p < .05 one-tailed) occurred for surface 
disturbance and NOX emission (both -24%).97 Emission of PM10 (-23%) and PM2.5 
(-24%), reductions in the number of wells drilled (-<1%), and miles of pipeline 
built (-2%) were all trending towards significance (p < .10 one-tailed).98 Impacts to 
wetlands were reduced dramatically between the Draft EIS and the ROD, though 
these reductions were not statistically significant.99  
 NOX, PM10, and PM2.5 emissions as well as wetland impacts are all common 
concerns associated with oil and gas development, and all experienced large 
reductions.100 In contrast, SO2 and CO are subject to action-forcing regulation under 
the Clean Air Act but were generally well below national ambient air quality 
standards,101 and both experienced comparatively minor impact reductions (-5%).102 
Lower rates of emission reduction may indicate that agencies focus their efforts on 
pollutants of local concern, which is consistent with NEPA’s mandate to focus on 
significant impacts.103  
 Transitioning towards directional drilling and consolidating well pads—a 
change that appears to have been driven by technological advancements and NEPA 
comments rather than substantive environmental laws such as the Clean Air Act or 
Clean Water Act— resulted in 13% reductions in permanent surface disturbance 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (2011). 
96 John Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA—Substantive Effectiveness Under a Procedural 
Mandate: Assessment of Oil and Gas EISs in the Mountain West, 7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY 
& ENVTL. L. 39 (2016). 
97 Id. at 44. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 NEPA—Substantive Effectiveness Under a Procedural Mandate, supra note 104, at 44. 
101 Id. at 46.  
102 Id. at 44. 
103 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4(c). 
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and 10% reductions in temporary surface disturbance.104 Both disturbance 
reductions were statistically significant, indicating that meaningful reductions can 
likely occur solely under NEPA’s procedural mandate.  
 Critically, for oil and gas projects, job creation and state and local tax 
revenue increased in the face of enhanced environmental protections, though the 
rate of growth slowed as environmental protections increased.105 A review of the 
BLM’s Resource Management Plans fared similarly, reflecting a statistically 
significant increase in the application of more protective surface use stipulations 
without a significant change in either the projected number of jobs created or the 
number of oil and gas wells that could be drilled.106 In fact, the number of jobs 
created and wells drilled increased by 8% and 2%, respectively, despite 
strengthened environmental protections.107 Overall, reductions in environmental 
impact were achieved without a corresponding reduction in economic benefit. 
 To be clear, we are not arguing that NEPA compliance is without costs. We 
contend only that it would be a mistake to look solely to the cost of compliance 
without giving equal consideration to the benefits that flow from NEPA 
compliance. Of course, the parties who bear the cost of NEPA compliance may not 
be the ones who reap the majority of benefits, though there are numerous examples 
of proponents benefitting from the hard look required by NEPA.108 This challenge, 
 
104 NEPA—Substantive Effectiveness Under a Procedural Mandate, supra note 104, at 44. 
105 Id. at 44. 
106 John Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA, FLPMA, and Impact Reduction: An Empirical 
Assessment of BLM Resource Management Planning in the Mountain West, 46 ENVTL. L. 
953, 961-62 (2016). 
107 Id.  
108 Identification of issues earlier in a development process, when changes are easier and less 
expensive to make, is a commonly cited NEPA benefit. See EXAMPLES OF BENEFITS FROM 
THE NEPA PROCESS FOR ARRA FUNDED ACTIVITIES, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (2011). Examples of more concrete savings include an EA 
prepared by the Department of Energy (DOE) for the Savanah River Site that “resulted in 
solutions that were much more cost and time efficient, and limited the expected 
transportation impacts over the long term in the surrounding communities.” Id. at 8. At the 
Transuranic Waste Processing Center located within the Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee, “[e]arly consideration of environmental information during the review of 
proposals for the project helped DOE avoid costly analysis of alternatives that may not have 
been viable.” Id. at 9. At Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, New York, NEPA 
analysis helped identify previously unanticipated state permitting requirements and material 
supply issues, both of which were resolved faster because of NEPA. Id. An EIS prepared by 
the Federal Aviation Administration resulted in improved energy efficiency at the St. 
George, UT airport. Id. at 16. NASA, in conducting hurricane repairs at the Johnson Space 
Center “is expected to gain between 20 to 30 percent in energy efficiency on each building 
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however, extends to virtually all government programs. Minimizing externalities 
is, after all, one of the primary reasons that we have governments. 
 
B. How Burdensome is NEPA Litigation? 
 CEQ maintained a NEPA litigation database summarizing cases from 2001 
through 2013. NAEP also tracks NEPA litigation, and we rely on information 
contained in their annual reports to describe NEPA litigation that occurred in 
federal appellate courts from 2009 through 2018. Differences in methodology and 
period of coverage in the data provided by these two sources prevent direct 
comparison, though the two datasets provide a complimentary picture of NEPA 
litigation.  
 
1. How Much NEPA Litigation Actually Occurs? 
 Litigation over NEPA decisions is surprisingly rare. Based on CEQ data 
summarizing all NEPA cases filed between 2001 and 2013,  an average of 115 
NEPA cases were filed annually, including trial and appellate court cases. Most 
NEPA cases were resolved at the district court level without appeal. With federal 
agencies completing an estimated 51,300 NEPA decisions annually between 2001 
and 2013, an average of just 1 out of every 450 NEPA decisions (0.22%) result in 
litigation.109 The actual rate of challenges to NEPA decisions is almost certainly 
lower because this dataset does not distinguish between trial and appellate court 
litigation and therefore counts separate proceedings in the same case as unique 
lawsuits. Accordingly, we almost certainly overestimate the actual rate of legal 
challenges to NEPA decisions and our estimates can be viewed as a conservative 
upper estimate. However, even applying these conservative assumptions, the rate 
at which NEPA decisions are challenged is quite low.  
 
where Recovery Act funded roof repairs are being undertaken.” Id. at 17. The Army Corps 
of Engineers reports that “[a]nalysis conducted in conjunction with the NEPA [for dredging 
the Loraine Harbor in Ohio] verified that a greater volume of dredged material was suitable 
for unconfined open-lake placement thereby obviating the need to provide additional 
confined disposal capacity than was previously planned through the Lorain Harbor Dredged 
Material Management Plan.” Id. at 6.  
109 We applied the same methodology used in section III.A.1. in order to estimate the rate at 
which NEPA decisions are challenged, but we relied on an estimated average annual NEPA 
decision completion period from 2001 through 2013 in order to maintain the same averaging 
period in both our numerator and denominator. Dividing the average number of NEPA case 
filings from 2001 through 2013 (115) by our estimate of the number of final NEPA decisions 
completed over the same period (51,300) indicates that on average, just 0.22% of all final 
NEPA decisions are challenged in federal court. 
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 The rate at which NEPA decisions are challenged, while low, declined 
steadily over the thirteen-year period reflected in the CEQ data, falling from 138 in 
2001 to 96 in 2013. NEPA case filings were below the thirteen-year average during 
each of the last five years for which the CEQ reported litigation data. Challenges to 
NEPA decisions completed by the four federal land management agencies also 
declined from 2001 through 2013, though not quite at the pace of decline 





 From 2005 through 2013, the CEQ also reported data on the type of NEPA 
document at issue in litigation. Of the 729 court dispositions for which the CEQ 
reported on the level of analysis at issue, 379 (52.0%) involved EISs or 
supplemental EISs. Of the remaining cases, 231 (31.7%) involved EAs, 66 (9.1%) 
involved CEs, and 53 (7.3%) involved a threshold determination of whether NEPA 
analysis was required.  
 We can estimate the rate at which federal courts issue determinations on 
NEPA adequacy for each class of NEPA document by dividing the number of 
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NEPA case dispositions over a set period of time by the estimated total number of 
NEPA documents that were prepared over that same time period. But because of 
the time that occurs between the point at which an agency finalizes its NEPA 
decision and the point in time when a court issues its final opinion on that 
document, we must offset the data for those two periods of time.  
 NEPA litigation takes, on average, 23 months to complete.110 We therefore 
divided the total number of NEPA case dispositions from 2005 through 2013 by 
the estimated total number of NEPA documents prepared from 2003 through 2011. 
When we do so we find that 16.7% of EISs were subject to litigation that concluded 
in a final judgment on the adequacy of the EIS. EAs and CEs were far less likely to 
be subject to litigation resulting in final judgment on NEPA adequacy, with EAs 
and CEs being subject to litigation that concluded in a final judgment on the 
adequacy of the analysis 1.0% and 0.01%, respectively.  
 In addition to NEPA litigation data provided by the CEQ, NAEP also tracks 
federal appellate court litigation involving NEPA and reports statistics in their 
annual NEPA report. We reviewed the NAEP’s annual NEPA reports from 2009 
through 2018 to identify the number of appellate court opinions issued each year. 
Differences between courts precludes direct comparison between the CEQ and 
NAEP datasets, but both the volume and trend in appellate litigation involving 
NEPA are notable.  
 From 2009 through 2018, federal appellate courts issued a total of 235 
opinions involving NEPA decisions, or an average of 23.5 decisions each year. Of 
these appellate opinions, 100 (42.6%) involved EISs, for an average of 10 opinions 
on EISs annually. Of the remaining cases, an average of 9.4 (40.0%) per year 
involved EAs, 1.8 (7.7%) involved CEs, and 2.3 (9.8%) involved a threshold 
determination of whether NEPA was required at all.   
 
 
110 David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Presidential and Judicial Politics in 
Environmental Litigation, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 38 (2018). 
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 In contrast to the trend in all court filings, the average number of appellate 
court cases increased slightly over the period covered by the NAEP dataset. It 
appears that the different trend evidenced by the two datasets may be attributable 











EISs 52.0%     42.6%  
EAs 31.7%   40.0%  
CEs 9.1%   7.7%  
NEPA Applicability 7.3%   9.8%  
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3716579
** Pre-Publication Draft ** 
66 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L INST. ___ (2020). 
 
[Sept. 4, 2020 Draft] 27 
 Looking more closely, NEPA litigation at the trial court level takes an 
average of 23 months to conclude,111 and just over 9 months are required to 
complete appellate litigation (from filing of the notice of appeal to final 
disposition).112 If we assume a three year lag between the year in which an agency 
rendered a decision on an EIS and the year in which the court of appeals ruled on a 
NEPA decision, we can roughly estimate the rate at which NEPA decisions are 
subjected to appellate court litigation.   
 Utilizing EPA data on the number of EISs completed from 2006 through 
2015, we were able to calculate that federal agencies issued 2,235 final EIS 
decisions,113 or an average of 224 annually over the period corresponding to the 
NAEP dataset. With an average of 10 appellate opinions on EISs and an average of 
224 final EIS decisions annually over that period, we can estimate that 
approximately 4.5% of EISs result in appellate litigation.   
 Assuming that EAs and CEs account for approximately 5% and 95% of all 
NEPA decisions, as reported by the GAO, and estimating the number of EAs and 
CEs based on the number of EISs reported by the EPA as we did above, we find 
that there were an average of 2,300 EAs and 43,800 CEs completed annually from 
2006 through 2015. As reported by NAEP, there were an average of 9.4 and 1.8 
federal appellate court opinions involving EAs and CEs, respectively, issued from 
2009 through 2018. Accordingly, just 0.4% of EAs and 0.004% of CEs result in 
appellate court litigation.  
 
Table 5. 
Estimated Percent of NEPA Decisions Subject to Litigation  




EISs 16.7% 4.5% 
EAs 1.0% 0.4% 




112 Based on the 12-month period concluding September 30, 2019. United States Courts, Table 
N/A—U.S. Courts of Appeals Federal Court Management Statistics (Sept. 30, 2019). 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-
statistics/2019/09/30-2.  
113 Final EISs, Supplemental Final EISs, or Revised Final EISs. 
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2. How Are NEPA Challenges Resolved?  
 From 2001 through 2013, the CEQ tracked NEPA litigation outcomes, 
placing decisions in one of eight non-exclusive categories.114 Looking exclusively 
at final judgments constituting a clear outcome—judgments for the defendant 
(government) and remands—the CEQ reported 832 wins and 226 remands, 
representing a 78.6% win rate.115 Federal agency win rates generally increased over 
that period with federal agencies prevailing in about 75% or more of cases every 
year except for 2006, when success rates fell to 63.6%.  
 NAEP tracks federal appellate court litigation involving NEPA and codes 
litigation outcomes as falling within one of three categories: federal agency 
complete wins, federal agency partial wins, and federal agency losses. From 2009 
through 2018, the federal government scored complete wins in 76.2% of appellate 
cases involving NEPA and complete or partial wins in 82.1% of NEPA cases. As 
seen in Figure 6., the federal government’s complete win rate was above 60% in all 
years except for 2011, when the win rate fell precipitously, to just 30.8% (38.5% 
when considering both wins and partial wins).  
 One possible explanation for this dip involves NEPA decisions that may 
have been rushed to completion near the end of the Bush Administration, in 2008. 
As noted earlier, we estimate that there is a roughly three-year lag between issuance 
of a final agency decision and issuance of an appellate court ruling on that decision. 
It may be that the Bush Administration sought to complete NEPA reviews for 
particularly controversial projects, or projects implementing policies that were 
deemed less likely to receive support from a new administration, before a new 
President was sworn into office. If this is true, the higher rate of challenge, and 
appellate court reversals three years after the end of an administration, could be due 
to either increased controversy surrounding certain projects or analysis that may 
have suffered because of artificially tight timelines.  
 
 
114 These categories are: judgments for the defendant (government), temporary restraining 
orders, preliminary injunctions, permanent injunctions, remands, dismissals with- and 
without a settlement, and other.  
115 In a recent publication, one of the authors of this paper attempted to lump more of the 
decisions into wins and losses. See Ruple & Race, supra note 68. We did not adopt that 
approach here because of concerns that comingling temporary and final relief together 
would result in double counting.  
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 We note that this pattern does not appear to hold in all instances based on 
our analysis of the CEQ data, which largely involves trial court opinions. When 
considering trial court opinions, we would anticipate a roughly two-year lag 
between the final agency action and a trial court opinion.116 The notable dip in wins 
that occurred in 2006, two years after an election is consistent with our hypothesis 
that an administration may rush to issue decisions before an election. Federal 
agencies, however, prevailed at higher than expected rates in NEPA litigation 
during 2010, which was two years after the 2008 Presidential election.  
 Politics clearly has the potential to play a role in the kinds of actions that 
are proposed by federal agencies, and the guidance issued to direct agency NEPA 
processes. Politics also could impact the way in which federal agencies undertake 
their NEPA analysis, and the way in which courts view those decisions.117 Further 
research therefore appears warranted in order to inform policy decisions and NEPA 
practice.  
 
116 See Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 119 and accompanying text.  
117 Id. 
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 The CEQ’s data is also useful in understanding the grounds upon which 
NEPA cases are resolved. From 2005 through 2013, the CEQ distinguishes between 
decisions in which the defendant (government) prevailed and decisions in which 
the plaintiffs prevailed. The CEQ further divided those wins and losses based on 
whether the case was resolved on one of six grounds: jurisdictional, whether NEPA 
was required, CE adequacy, EA adequacy, EIS adequacy, and supplemental EIS 
adequacy.  
 As shown in Table 6, most cases (76.9%) were resolved based on a review 
of the adequacy of the agency’s NEPA analysis. The more demanding the review, 
the more likely courts were to reverse those decisions. It is unclear whether this 
reflects application of a less deferential standard to EISs and Supplemental EISs, 
or whether the more intense level of scrutiny associated with an EIS is more likely 
to daylight problems with the underlying analysis and agency reasoning.  
 Conventional wisdom suggests that EAs are less defensible than EISs 
because EAs must result in a “finding of no significant impact,” while an EIS can 
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lead to project approval even where significant environmental impacts are likely to 
occur. However, with the federal government prevailing at a higher rate in 




Basis for Resolution of Federal Court NEPA Litigation 2005-2013 
 Total 
Dispositions 




Jurisdictional 151 17.2% 86.1% 
NEPA required?  53 6.0% 69.8% 
CE adequacy 66 7.5% 68.2% 
EA adequacy 231 26.3% 62.3% 
EIS adequacy 312 35.5% 58.3% 
SEIS adequacy 67 7.6% 52.2% 
Total Dispositions 880 -- 65.1% 
 
3. NEPA Compared to Civil Environmental Litigation with 
the Government as a Defendant 
 To better understand how NEPA litigation impacts federal agencies, and 
how agencies fare in NEPA litigation compared to other types of litigation, we 
reviewed information on civil litigation handled by the Office of the U.S. Attorney 
from 2001 through 2017.118 These Annual Statistical Reports provide the number 
of civil cases in federal court that involve environmental or lands claims and where 
the federal government was the defendant.119 We then compared the federal 
government’s success rate in these cases to the government’s success rate in NEPA 
litigation.  
 The U.S. Attorneys Reports place litigation outcomes into one of five 
categories: federal wins (25.6%), settlements (11.4%), federal losses (11.3%), 
dismissals (19.2%), and other (32.5%). “Other,” unfortunately, was the largest 
category of decisions. “Other” outcomes aside, there was little discernable trend in 
the rate at which the Department of Justice prevailed or lost in environmental/lands 
litigation. Settlements did increase slightly over time, as did dismissals, which 
spiked in 2016. See Figure 8.  
 
 
118 Date compiled from UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT [FISCAL 
YEARS], available at: https://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/annual-statistical-reports. 
119 Id. at Table 5.  
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 The CEQ, in contrast, utilized eight non-exclusive categories: judgments 
for the defendant (government), temporary restraining orders, preliminary 
injunctions, permanent injunctions, remands, dismissals with a settlement, 
dismissals without a settlement, and other. To facilitate a comparison between the 
two datasets, we excluded “other” from both datasets. For the CEQ data, we 
combined dismissals with and without settlement, we excluded preliminary relief, 
and we excluded permanent injunctions because they are presumably associated 
with a remand to address an error and therefore redundant. After making these 
changes we found that based on both datasets, the federal government prevails at 
about the same rate: 45.6% to 47.6%. Federal agencies are, however, less likely to 
settle or obtain a dismissal in NEPA litigation, and accordingly, lose more 
frequently in NEPA litigation than in environmental/lands litigation generally.  
 An important caveat associated with this comparison is that the U.S. 
Attorneys Reports do not define what cases are included in the 
“environmental/lands” category. NEPA cases may be included in the 
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environmental/lands category, which regularly involves about four times as many 
cases as annual NEPA litigation.   
 
Table 7. 
Comparison of Litigation Outcomes: Civil Environmental/Lands Litigation 
with Federal Defendants and NEPA Litigation 
 Environmental/Lands 2001-2017 NEPA 2001-2013 
Federal Win 45.6% 47.6% 
Settlement 18.2% 13.4% 
Federal Loss 10.8% 19.7% 
Dismissal  25.5% 19.4% 
 
IV. THOUGHTS ON “STREAMLINING” 
 The federal government should continually seek to reduce administrative 
burdens and costs wherever possible, provided those reductions do not undermine 
achievement of statutory obligations, and NEPA is no exception. The sheer number 
of NEPA decisions completed every year attests to the amount of time and effort 
expended complying with NEPA. Fixation on cost reduction should not, however, 
blind us to either the benefits foregone or the consequences of changing NEPA’s 
implementing regulations. There are several areas where data appears to indicate 
that NEPA “streamlining,” as currently envisioned, is likely to result in increased 
litigation and project delays. We focus here on two that we find most concerning.  
 
A. The “Hard Look Requirement”  
 When reviewing a NEPA decision, courts consider whether the agency took 
the requisite “hard look” at likely impacts.120 The hard look standard grows not from 
NEPA’s implementing regulations, but from section 101 of the Act itself.121 Section 
101 is Congress’ declaration of our national environmental policy, and it is 
axiomatic that an agency cannot change a policy that has been enacted into law by 
passing a contrary regulation.122  
 
120 See e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
121 42 U.S.C. § 4331. “The sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of NEPA are thus realized 
through a set of ‘action-forcing’ procedures that require that agencies take a ‘hard look’ at 
environmental consequences.” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 
427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976)). 
122 “The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject 
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.” Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). “Chevron allows 
agencies to choose among competing reasonable interpretations of a statute; it does not 
license interpretive gerrymanders under which an agency keeps parts of statutory context it 
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 Streamlining efforts do not change the Supreme Court mandated standard 
of review. Existing guidance123 and recent revisions to NEPA’s implementing 
regulations124 impose strict timelines and page limits. Time limits will result in less 
opportunity to obtain, consider, and respond to comments from state and federal 
agencies, Tribal governments, and the public, as well as less time to investigate 
potential impacts, alternatives, and mitigation opportunities. Page limits will make 
it more difficult for agencies to explain their analysis and conclusions, and may 
complicate efforts to consider an adequate range of alternatives to the proposed 
action. Whether federal agencies can satisfy the same substantive hard look 
requirement in less time and with less space to document their analysis is a question 
that will almost certainly land in the courts as streamlining efforts proceed. 
Similarly, whether an analysis with an abridged suite of action alternatives readily 
satisfies hard look requirements also appears to be a question destined for the 
courts. While some agencies may be able to do more with less, others almost 
certainly will struggle, and litigation-related delays could prove costly for some 
projects.  
 
B. Relationship Between the Time to Complete NEPA Documents 
& Litigation Rates  
 Our colleagues David Adelman and Robert Glicksman recently calculated 
the number of EISs produced by an agency as a percent of all EISs prepared 
government-wide.125 They then calculated each agency’s share of all EIS 
litigation.126 Combining these two figures results in a production to litigation ratio, 
where a ratio greater than one indicates a higher than average rate of NEPA 
litigation.127 Comparing the litigation ratio to the amount of time spent on the NEPA 
analysis shows that going fast increases the risk of litigation.128  
 Looking at the four federal agencies that prepared the largest number of 
EISs from 2010 through 2017, Adelman and Glicksman found that the Forest 
Service prepared 276 EISs and had a litigation ratio of 1.4, indicating that Forest 
Service EISs were challenged at a rate roughly 40% higher than that for all agencies 
 
likes while throwing away parts it does not.” Michigan v. E.P.A., 576 U.S. 743, 754 (2015). 
123 Secretary of the Interior, Order No. 3355 (Aug. 31, 2017). 
124 Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304-76 (July 16, 2020) (final rule to be codified 
in 40 C.F.R. Parts 1500 through 1518). 
125 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 119. 
126 Id. at 30.  
127 Id.  
128 Ruple & Race, supra note 68. 
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government-wide.129 The Bureau of Land Management came in a distant second in 
terms of the number of EISs produced, accounting for 128 and a litigation ratio of 
1.0.130 The Federal Highway Administration was almost as active, preparing 114 
EISs over the study period, but doing so while generating a litigation ratio of just 
0.3.131 The Army Corps of Engineers prepared 89 EISs with a litigation ratio of 
0.5.132  
 These ratios, when combined with the time spent on EIS preparation, 
provide a strong caution against rigid and unrealistic timelines for NEPA 
completion. The less time an agency spent on EIS preparation, the more likely that 
agency was to be sued.133 As noted above, median completion time for an EIS was 
3.6 years. The BLM, with a litigation ratio of 1.0 was almost average, requiring 3.8 
years to complete an EIS. The Forest Service cut approximately 7 months from EIS 
preparation time, but they did so at the expense of increased litigation. The Federal 
Highway Administration and Army Corps of Engineers both spent considerably 
more time on EIS preparation and had significantly lower litigation ratios.  
 Rapid EIS preparation, in short, was associated with a higher rate of 
litigation.134 With NEPA litigation taking years to complete, gains in preparation 
time may be more than offset by time lost to litigation. These delays will only 
increase if a reviewing court remands the NEPA decision because an agency, in an 
effort to meet a strict deadline, overlooked an issue. While we will not know the 
true effect of streamlining efforts for several years, it appears likely that the benefits 
gained by expediting NEPA could be subsumed by even greater costs for NEPA 
litigation and document revision.  
 
V. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS  
 NEPA appears to be working better than many believe, with roughly 99% 
of all NEPA decisions avoiding the most rigorous analysis contained in an EIS. 
Yes, EISs are subject to litigation at fairly high rates, but that is not surprising 
considering that they are conducted for the 1% of projects that require the highest 
level of analysis and that involve the most significant environmental impacts. 
Overall, just 0.22% of NEPA decisions result in litigation and that, we believe, says 
more about NEPA than anomalous EISs mired in litigation.  
 
129 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 119, at 30. 
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Ruple & Race, supra note 68. 
134 Id.  
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 As we stated throughout and reiterate here, we support efforts to improve 
NEPA efficacy, and we believe that such efforts should be grounded in a solid 
understanding of how NEPA works in action. Streamlining efforts that increase the 
rate of legal challenges will be counterproductive. 
 NEPA reform should start with careful compilation of data that improves 
our understanding of how NEPA works, where it is working efficiently and where 
NEPA is bogging down, and the benefits that NEPA provides. Reform unmoored 
from an understanding of NEPA practice increases the risk of unintended 
consequences. Reform without a mechanism to measure the effect of regulatory 
changes also leaves federal agencies and others with no good way to tell whether 
changes produce the intended effect.   
 We find the decline in resources available to federal agencies particularly 
striking, and perhaps no agency is suffering as much as the Forest Service, which 
appears to be rushing to complete its NEPA analysis. While we applaud the Forest 
Service for trying to do more with less, it appears that quality may be suffering 
because of the intense pressure being placed on that agency. The result is more 
litigation and more remands, which obviously place a heavy burden on already 
stretched agency resources. The Service may benefit from slowing down to go 
faster.   
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